Objective: Improve institutional quality. The AVAF course for the PAS staff of the University of Valencia on risk prevention in public management concludes.

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The last session of the course “Prevention of corruption in public management”, prepared by the Valencian Anti-Fraud Agency, in collaboration with the University of Valencia, was given by Anselm Bodoque, head of the AVAF Training Service.

“The cost of corruption and public policies against corruption in Europe and Spain”, the title of the presentation, made it possible to share reflections on the various aspects of the negative effects of fraud and the general interest.

Excessive public spending, the reduction of public investment in essential services, the exclusion of innovative and honest companies or permissiveness in the face of tax fraud were some of the negative effects that were exposed in the session on corruption in public management on the 9 March 2022.

During the conference, it was stressed that fraud also implies economic and reputational costs for society, for public management, the legitimacy of institutions and collective well-being.

The second part of the conference focused on the study of the configuration process of public policies against corruption in Europe, Spain, and the Valencian Community.

The temporal origin can be placed around 1990, in the context of the III Industrial and Technological Revolution, the fall of the Berlin Wall and globalization. The OECD, the EU, the Council of Europe and the UN are the first international organizations that promote conventions, agreements or organizations to combat corruption.

The beginning of public policies on corruption at the international and European levels put the accent on the fight against organized crime, political corruption, and the legal and police persecution of the corrupt. In the session, it was insisted on the fact that Spain does not have a general strategy to prevent and fight against corruption, such as the one that has been developed in the Valencian Community since 2015, which has incorporated initiatives aimed at improving institutional quality.

The session highlighted that it is precisely on improving the general institutional quality that initiatives should be concentrated to reduce our level of corruption and place it at the levels of the most advanced countries in Europe. In fact, countries with lower rates of corruption base their position on having a strong, democratic and socially legitimate institutional system and allocate fewer resources to the legal, regulatory and police prosecution of corruption.

Throughout five weeks, the managers of the PAS staff of the University of Valencia have actively participated in the sessions where the existence of the institutional system of integrity in our country, the necessary integrity plans in public organizations, the phases of the anti-fraud cycle of Order 1030/2021 of September 29, as well as the costs of corruption in the public sphere.

Along with the lectures given, the attendees were the protagonists of a practical session where they had the opportunity to reflect on the protection of corruption whistleblowers, the necessary implementation of internal and external reporting channels, the importance of informal alerts, and the strategic vision of planning as a tool to combat irregularities and risks known to public administrations.

The AVAF appreciates the predisposition of collaboration and support of the Permanent Training and Educational Innovation Service (SFPIE) and its interest in the work of the Agency in matters of public integrity.

The institutional architecture of integrity policies in Spain

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(Regarding the guide to the application of anti-fraud measures of the National Anti-Fraud Coordination Service) Preliminate For some years now, there has been a governmental organizational tendency that inserts supposed “independent” bodies within ministerial structures. In fact, for there to be functional independence of a body, at least the following premises must be given: a) That the appointment does not occur by free appointment or appointment nor can it entail free cessation (during the period of its mandate or exercise it can only be dismissed for assessed reasons); b) That in the appointment process the merits and competences of the different candidates are objectively assessed; and (c) That the body is not within the hierarchical structure (enjoying, at least, an effective status of functional autonomy) of the ministerial departments nor is it subject to guidelines or subordinate to other bodies. The reality of these organizational solutions (to some extent fakes or impostadas) begins to offer different modalities, some of them inserted in the Ministry of HFP (for example, OIRESCON, which I already dealt with at the time: https://www.hayderecho.com/2019/03/07/las-instrucciones-de-la-oficina-independiente-de-regulacion-y-supervision-de-la-contratacion/ ; and now, for reasons of contingency, the National Anti-Fraud Coordination Service takes center stage). The phenomenon would require more intense attention on the part of the doctrine. The creation of the National Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (SNCA) was carried out by the twenty-fifth additional provision of the General Subsidies Law, incorporated in 2015 to comply with the provision established in Article 3.4 of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) 833/2013, on investigations carried out by OLAF (European Luca Anti-Fraud Office). However, the provisions of recital 10 of that regulation must be taken into account when it states: “Where a Member State has not set up a specialised service at national level responsible for the task of coordinating the protection of the Union’s financial interests and the fight against fraud, a service (‘the anti-fraud coordination service’) should be designated to facilitate cooperation and the exchange of information. n effective with the Office”. In other words, this service was created in the alternative in the absence of an institution (specialised service, whether it is called an Agency or any other name) which should have, by the nature of things, a status of functional autonomy similar to that provided by OLAF. And as long as it does not exist, which is happening today (although the Draft Law made public yesterday, March 8, by the Ministry of Justice, on the protection of persons who report “on corruption”, does create, although with very limited functions, an “Independent Authority for the Protection of the Informant”) such functions of coordination of the protection of the financial interests of the Union will be carried out provisionally.  that service, which has been transferred to national law under the same name as laid down in the European regulation. The logical thing would be for these “provisional” functions to be placed in the specialized body in their day, if it is not designed  as a capital institution without effective competences in integrity. What The European regulations do not tell us is how to articulate this “service”. La DA 25ª of the LGS established that “it will exercise its powers with full independence“, a characterization that does not fit very well with the forecast contained in Royal Decree 682/2021, when it is stated that it exercises its functions under the direction and supervision of the National Audit Office, both bodies with the rank of general subdirectorate dependent on the IGAE.  Despite the dialectical efforts it entails (for example in article 22 of Royal Decree Law 36/2020 and in the Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan), and thus we have sold it to the European Union, calling the IGAE an independent body would not meet the aforementioned requirements either.  Admittedly, as was said, the creation of the SNCA was due to that requirement of context (absence of an institution or specialized body  to combat fraud in Spain), and in order to comply with that anomie in order to give effect to the provisions of Article 3.4 of the OLAF Regulation. However, in that same paragraph 3.4 “in fine”, an important closing clause is foreseen: “Where appropriate, in accordance with national law, the anti-fraud coordination service may be considered the competent authority for the purposes of this Regulation”.  In other words, what the OLAF Regulation does – as it could not be otherwise – is to recognise the obvious: the principle of institutional autonomy as regards the transposition of EU law by the Member States requires that  it will be the internal system of distribution of competences of  each State. the one that determines to what extent the SNCA will or will not be a “competent authority” for the purposes of the aforementioned regulations. Something that obviously in our case does not occur. The OLAF Regulation therefore gives the task of “coordinating the protection of the Union’s financial interests and the fight against fraud”, which has many limitations in itself in a State of composite structure (with levels of government endowed with regulatory and organisational autonomy), from the consideration of such a “service” as a “competent authority”.  Two very marked roles that in the execution of the PRTR must be taken into account. As has been said, these regulatory budgets served to create the aforementioned body in 2015 under the conditions set out above; but this was a contingent measure (in the absence of a specialised institution), derived from the TFEU (Articles 310, 317 and, in particular, 325) and Directive 1303/2013, from common provisions on European funds.  and for a management area then limited (European ESI funds of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020), but that the countercyclical measures implemented with the European Recovery Instrument and with the Recovery and Resilience Mechanism itself, have multiplied by five the financial resources to be implemented in each budget year. In addition, the requirements of the EU’s 2018 Financial Regulation already made it crystal clear that the shared management of European funds required all national authorities to adopt measures to prevent, detect and…

Gender and corruption. Transparency International Spain

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On the occasion of the celebration of March 8, International Women’s Day, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1977, Transparency International Spain has published the dossier “Gender and corruption”. For his presentation, he will hold a webinar on Tuesday, March 8, at 10:30 a.m. https://transparencia.org.es/8m-dia-internacional-de-la-mujer-inscribete-al-webinar-sobre-genero-y-corrupcion/ Throughout the entire dossier, reference is made to a large number of studies that will allow those most interested in the matter to delve into the issue. Sources, resources and materials, as well as relevant articles from Transparency International (TI) that can be found here. https://transparencia.org.es/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Dossier-Ge%CC%81nero-y-Corrupcio%CC%81n-TI-E.pdf What is the relationship between gender and corruption? Given the first question raised by TI Spain, the complex relationship between gender and corruption can already be glimpsed, and it will be necessary to study it from different points of view. Men and women are affected differently by the phenomenon of corruption, since it produces worse effects on poor and vulnerable groups, and it must be remembered that, according to the UN, it is estimated that 70% of the poor in the world are women. One of the effects produced by corruption is the increase in obstacles to the achievement of equality, in all senses, also in the field of gender equality, by preventing the full development of civil, social and economic rights of the woman. Women, by traditionally developing a caretaker role in the family sphere, have been deprived of the possibility of actively participating in social and political spaces, and leading the direction of many of the transformations that have taken place in society in which last decades. In turn, women, depending on services such as health or education, appear, according to the TI dossier, as more vulnerable to certain types of bribery. It is necessary to advance in the empowerment of women in all senses, also in the assumption of a relevant role in the fight against corruption. “Gender and corruption” by Transparency International Spain specifies that there is no conclusive evidence to confirm that women are less corrupt than men; but the dossier details that the fight for women’s rights and their participation in public life are associated with better governance and lower levels of corruption in many countries around the world. Perceptions, attitudes and behaviors of women towards corruption. Among the studies cited by “Gender and Corruption” of Transparency International, Rivas (2012) or Lambsdorff, Boehme & Frank (2010) specify that women tend to behave more honestly than men and are more concerned about equity in their relationships. decisions. Even more, related to the behavior of women towards corruption, it is pointed out by Swamy et al. (2000) the claim that “women are less involved in bribery and less likely to approve of taking bribes” and conclude that countries that have made the most progress in gender equality generally “experience lower levels of corruption” (Swamy et al. 2000). The reality reflects the underrepresentation of women in decision-making positions in business and politics, these being the environments where the greatest risk of corruption occurs. This does not mean that women would act in a less corrupt manner if they had access to high-level management, if it does not increase the real and effective equality of women and men in society as a whole. Therefore, it is concluded that progress must be made in said equality, and the full participation of women in public life must be achieved, but not as an “anti-corruption strategy”; but because it is a human right. Corruption and bad governance, according to the dossier, have a negative effect on the participation of women in politics, trapping them in the vicious circle of gender inequalities, lack of empowerment and corruption (Sundstrom & Wangnerund 2013). Women as part of the solution: gender approach in the fight against corruption “Gender and Corruption” by Transparency International Spain also focuses on the forms of corruption that most affect women: sexual extortion and human trafficking. The dossier claims that they be recognized as a corruption problem so that resources and efforts can be concentrated to eradicate them. From “Thinking” to “Doing” Transparency International proposes a series of measures to address the issue of gender and corruption: Collect, analyze and disseminate data disaggregated by gender in order to design effective public policies. Recognize and address specific forms of corruption based on gender. As is the case with sexual extortion (sextortion) Support the participation of women in public and political life. Gender quotas and reducing unpaid work with lower wages will facilitate the increase in women’s participation in all areas of society. Include women in decision-making against corruption. Half of the population cannot be left out of the spheres of political, economic, administrative and social decision. Empower women. Being aware of the rights that they have as people is a way to minimize the risk of being greater victims of corruption risks. Gender-sensitive reporting mechanisms. Use existing platforms. The dossier exposes for your knowledge the Feminist Open Government Initiative of the Open Government Partnership, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as examples of existing platforms already working in this field. It is necessary to become aware of the negative effects that corruption produces in society and in the democratic and institutional system that is also directly affecting women, as citizens of right. Their traditional role as caregivers has prevented them from hampering their role as active citizens of society, so it is necessary to advocate for ending the existing imbalances in the exercise of power and decision-making between women and men. The data from “Gender and Corruption” state that they are not conclusive in the statement that, if women who occupy leadership positions would be intrinsically less corrupt than men, and details what they will be in this case, “other factors such as the political context and institutional, culture and gender inequalities to explain the links between female representation and levels of corruption”. Claiming the presence and active role of women in public…