Aug272025

Dismantling Anti-Fraud in Valencia

In reference to the interview published in a national newspaper, on June 21, 2025, with Mr. Fernando Jiménez Sánchez. After requesting the media, on two occasions, the publication of this opinion article to exercise the right to reply to Mr. Jiménez’s statements about the Valencian Anti-Fraud Agency and not obtaining a response about its publication, we share the opinion article sent:

 

Dismantling Anti-Fraud in Valencia

 

In recent months, a worrying practice has spread: constructing narratives where facts are secondary, data become accessories and victimization, fueled by growing polarization, becomes the discursive axis. Conferences, conferences and tribunes follow one another frequently, and although the Valencian Anti-Fraud Agency (AVAF) does not appear as a central issue, the opportunity to revile it with statements disconnected from reality is not wasted. It is even more serious if we consider that many of the rapporteurs have had links, direct or indirect, with this institution.

 

It seems that some would rather see the Agency disappear than admit that it may be run by people outside their circle of trust. Between nostalgic reproaches and epic stories of the past, an idealized image of the previous stage is constructed, contrasting it with an almost Machiavellian vision of the present.

 

In this context, Mr. Jiménez, in a recently published interview, responded to a question about the alleged “dismantling” of the AVAF with a double statement:

 

“Why have they destroyed the AVAF in practice? Well, it is closely related to the judicial expert reports that were being carried out by the investigation team of the corruption trials of the Zaplana era. It’s as simple as that. This destroys the country…”

 

In view of such a statement, it is appropriate to offer objective data: on May 16, 2024, AVAF officials defended the expert report referred to in court. That performance concluded that same day. The new director took office on July 23, 2024, and the judgment of the Provincial Court was issued on October 15, 2024. Chronologically, it is impossible for there to have been any intervention by the new leadership in that case. Therefore, the insinuation is unfounded and malicious. From the AVAF we wonder if an administrative infraction is being suggested or, directly, the commission of a crime. Hurling accusations without evidence, in the style of “throwing the stone and hiding the hand”, does not seem to be the procedure of an academic.

 

The AVAF depends organically on Les Corts Valencianes, not on the Government of the Generalitat Valenciana. Since August 1, 2024, the parliamentary groups have requested 55 files, all of them delivered in a timely manner. Most refer to actions from the previous mandate. When the new management took office, there was a live load of 659 files. Currently, and despite having received 331 new complaints in 2025, this figure has been reduced to 512.

 

As of 23 July 2024, the delay in the processing of complaints exceeded 15 months; Today, complaints filed in 2025 are being resolved within the deadline. In addition, 200 new entities have been added to the register of those responsible for the Internal Information System (67 public and 133 private).

 

Far from being diminished, the Agency’s powers have increased. I must also point out that the positions of Secretary General and Coordinator of the Evaluation, Verification and Inspection area have recently joined this Agency, following a selection process, incorporating a Lawyer from the Generalitat Valenciana and a Tax Inspector from the State Tax Agency. Files continue to be sent to the Public Prosecutor’s Office and its operational activity has been strengthened. All while keeping your budget intact.

 

It is striking that someone with Mr. Jiménez’s academic background – a professor, member of Transparency International and the advisory board of the Hay Derecho Foundation – would make such unfounded statements. Until their legal suppression, the aforementioned organizations were part of the AVAF’s Citizen Participation Council (CPC). He himself was appointed to that body directly by the previous director, without formally representing any entity.

 

The surprise is even greater if one remembers that, as a representative of the University of Murcia, together with the University of Lisbon, Mr. Jiménez prepared the report “Comparative perceptions of corruption in Spain and Portugal”, with logistical and economic support from the AVAF (October 2022).

 

Likewise, the previous management of the Agency was going to collaborate in a European project, with Mr. Jiménez himself as principal investigator. Despite the interest in the project, the new management of the AVAF declined to participate because it exceeded the scope of regional competence.

 

Perhaps the disagreement lies in the succession in the position of director. Mr. Jiménez’s candidate — also the outgoing director and the vast majority of the CPC — was not elected. The legitimate defence of a candidacy does not justify a campaign of constant discredit, which began even before the current director took office. Much less so when the criticism extends to the entire institution and, therefore, to its officials.

 

And they continue along these lines. In a conference on the protection of corruption whistleblowers in Spain with the presence of former heads of the AVAF, the debate revolved more around the “golden age” of the Valencian Agency than on the announced title. It could well have been titled: “When we were the best”.

 

During the event, someone claimed that the recent legislative reform had abolished the Agency’s sanctioning regime. The statement was denied, at the same event, by a lawyer from the AVAF. He recalled that Law 11/2016 continues to attribute sanctioning power to management and that Law 2/2023 reinforces it, recognising the AVAF as the regional competent authority for the protection of whistleblowers. Even so, the official recording omits the interventions of the AVAF representatives, preventing a complete technical vision of the debate and compromising transparency.

 

Paradoxically, those who today lament the alleged loss of the sanctioning regime did not apply it for seven years. The only sanction imposed in that period was directed at a city council for refusing to collaborate. The lament for the loss of a tool that was barely used is surprising.

 

It was also stated that, by ceasing to prepare expert reports, the regional agencies were meaningless and “it would be better to close them”. It is worth remembering that only the AVAF has issued such reports (37, according to one of the speakers), while the rest of the regional agencies have not even issued one, according to their reports. Again, only the Valencian agency is attacked. But corruption schemes, unfortunately, can be cited in all communities with their own agency.

 

The functions of judicial collaboration are formally included in agreements such as the one signed on June 19, 2023 between the AVAF and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office. Clause 1(b) expressly provides for the request for technical support. And, in addition, the current leadership has not rejected this collaboration and reiterates its commitment to the rule of law. It should be noted that, except for one person, the technical team that prepared the expert reports is still on staff.

 

In the same interview, Mr. Jiménez added:

“I don’t care about the PP or the PSOE: my friend Manuel Villoria has been appointed president of the Independent Authority for the Protection of Whistleblowers; there is no staff or budget and everything has to go through the Ministry of Justice. What independent authority is that?”

 

The answer is surprising, coming from someone who elegantly defended the importance of institutional selection procedures. Even more surprising is the silence of those who vehemently censured the Valencian reform of 2024 – which provides for parliamentary elections with a reinforced or absolute majority – omitting that it is attached to Les Corts Valencianes. Surprising because they now do not object to the fact that, at the state level, the appointment of the president of the Independent Authority for the Protection of Whistleblowers (AAI) (art. 53 of Law 2/2023) falls directly on the Council of Ministers, at the proposal of the Minister of Justice, without curricular evaluation or qualified majority. And the president is appointed with the rank of undersecretary.

 

Here no one seems bothered by the absence of competitive competition, the laxity of the requirements or the opacity of the process, there was not even a qualification body that after examining the candidacies raised a list of three candidates for the presidency of the AAI.  This critical asymmetry highlights a worrying phenomenon: selective delegitimization. What is legitimate if decided by one like-minded environment becomes “institutional capture” if decided by another. The democratic standard cannot be applied according to personal or ideological affinity.

 

And this way of acting is projected in the selection of the AAI’s managerial staff, manager and director: summoned by free designation, published in the BOE on Saturday, with meagre deadlines (10 calendar days) and procedures that do not guarantee much: presentation of a curriculum vitae and a self-evaluation and those who pass the filter seem to be subjected to an interview by an expert to be determined. If this selection process is an essay by the current minister of the branch on procedures to be applied in the selection of prosecutors, state lawyers, tax inspectors… The concern installed in these groups is understandable.

 

Finally, it is worth remembering an obvious fact: if someone were to try to “control” the AVAF – a one-person institution if ever there was one – they would not eliminate the Council of Citizen Participation, but would simply do what was done previously, modify its composition according to their interests. Of course, it would retain what it inherited: a workforce made up mostly of personnel selected by free appointment. Instead, a new List of Jobs (RPT) was approved in December 2024 that imposes the provision of posts through competition, thus reinforcing the independence, autonomy and professionalism of the Agency’s officials.

 

Likewise, those who wished to exercise discretionary control would maintain procedures with interpretative gaps and ambiguous expiration periods in the area of verification and investigation, in order to use these regulatory gaps at their convenience. However, four Instructions on procedure have been issued and two technical offices independent of the directorate have been created: one in charge of the selection and distribution of complaints among investigators, and another aimed at standardizing the criteria for action.

 

And yes, due to the sensitivity of the issues discussed, this new stage of the AVAF is more similar – in terms of secrecy, professionalism and data protection – to the model of the State Tax Administration Agency than to other formats disguised as transparency that, through media sanction, base their legitimacy on an ecosystem of people with shared interests and systematically resorting to victimhood. Confusing public opinion by making them believe that they and not the Institution are the indispensable ones.

 

Eduardo Beut

Sent to the media: July 10, 2025

Jul232025

The Valencian Anti-Fraud Agency signs new collaboration protocols with public institutions to strengthen whistleblowing channels and public integrity

València, 23 july 2025.- The Valencian Anti-Fraud Agency (AVAF) continues to strengthen its efforts to prevent corruption and promote institutional integrity through the signing of various collaboration protocols with local entities, public bodies, and professional associations.

In recent months, the Director of AVAF, Eduardo Beut, has signed agreements with the Alicante Bar Association (21 February 2025), the Valencian Institute of Social Services – IVASS (19 February 2025), and CEU Cardenal Herrera University, through an addendum extending the educational cooperation agreement (9 January 2025).

Protocols have also been signed with the municipalities of Villena (13 January 2025), Paiporta and Llocnou de Sant Jeroni (both on 30 October 2024), Domeño (28 October 2024), Segart (25 October 2024), Xàtiva (10 October 2024), La Pobla del Duc (24 September 2024), and Ròtova (18 September 2024).

Additionally, the collaboration with the General Council of Notaries has been renewed through the first addendum extending the framework agreement signed on 2 October 2024, and an agreement has been formalised with the Valencian Institute of Agricultural Research – IVIA (25 September 2024).

Under these agreements, the signatory entities will enable AVAF’s whistleblowing channel as an external channel, which will be accessible through their respective websites. This channel guarantees the confidentiality of whistleblowers and allows for anonymous reporting.
These protocols allow the participating institutions to implement internal reporting systems (internal whistleblowing channels) in compliance with Law 2/2023, of 20 February, regulating the protection of individuals who report regulatory violations and fight against corruption.

This law, which transposes Directive (EU) 2019/1937 —known as the Whistleblowers Directive— into Spanish law, establishes the obligation to provide secure channels for receiving information on possible irregularities.

In addition to the implementation of these channels, the agreements include joint actions in training and awareness-raising. As such, staff from the signatory entities will receive training in key areas such as public ethics.

With these additions, AVAF facilitates regulatory compliance and promotes a culture of integrity, prevention, and detection of fraud and corruption.

 

Latest protocols signed, available on the Transparency Portal:

  • Alicante Bar Association. Signed on 21 February 2025.
  • Valencian Institute of Social Services (IVASS). Signed on 19 February 2025.
  • Municipality of Villena. Signed on 13 January 2025.
  • Addendum extending the educational cooperation agreement between the Valencian Anti-Fraud and Corruption Prevention Agency and CEU Cardenal Herrera University, for university student internships. Signed on 9 January 2025.
  • Municipality of Paiporta. Signed on 30 October 2024.
  • Municipality of Llocnou de Sant Jeroni. Signed on 30 October 2024.
  • Municipality of Domeño. Signed on 28 October 2024.
  • Municipality of Segart. Signed on 25 October 2024.
  • Municipality of Xàtiva. Signed on 10 October 2024.
  • First addendum extending the framework agreement between the General Council of Notaries and the Valencian Anti-Fraud and Corruption Prevention Agency. Signed on 2 October 2024.
  • Valencian Institute of Agricultural Research (IVIA). Signed on 25 September 2024.
  • Municipality of La Pobla del Duc. Signed on 24 September 2024.
  • Municipality of Ròtova. Signed on 18 September 2024.
Jul142025

Valencian Anti-Fraud Agency: That’s Not True, Mr. García

Regarding the opinion article published in a national economic newspaper on June 12, 2025, signed by Mr. Felipe García Hernández.
After requesting on two occasions that the newspaper publish this opinion piece to exercise the right of reply to Mr. García’s statements about the Valencian Anti-Fraud Agency, and being denied, we are sharing the submitted article:
 
Valencian Anti-Fraud Agency: That’s Not True, Mr. García

In the era of post-truth, defending public integrity has become a risky endeavor. June 23, Whistleblower Protection Day, is an ideal occasion to remember that protecting those who report irregularities is not only an ethical imperative but also a cornerstone of the rule of law. However, beyond rhetorical statements, this date calls for an uncomfortable reflection: what happens when the very institutions created to uphold integrity become the target of smear campaigns fueled by half-truths and self-serving narratives?

 

The Valencian Anti-Fraud Agency (AVAF) is a paradigmatic case. In recent months, it has been subjected to a media and political attack which, under the guise of legitimate criticism, conceals a deliberate strategy of delegitimization. Accountability is part of the daily work of this agency’s civil servants, as it should be in any public organization.

 

It is alarming that a minor reform of the AVAF, recently approved by the Valencian Parliament (Les Corts), has been equated, as Mr. García does, with the suspension of the FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) by the United States government. The confusion deepens when he mixes heterogeneous legal realities: conflating two legal regulations, a regulatory provision lacking sufficient legal support, and a code of ethics approved by the agency director’s resolution.

 

Let us therefore review some of the author’s claims:

He maintains that “the Citizen Participation Council, a vital channel between civil society and the Agency, has been eliminated.” However, the opinion issued by the Valencian Legal Advisory Council (CJC) on the AVAF’s internal regulations project was clear. It states:
“The Law 11/2016 creating the AVAF did not establish any participatory body whose structure, nature, functions, and composition should have been determined by the legislator. Thus, upon approving the regulation, Les Corts could have determined what type of bodies and entities should be represented in such a body and with what functions. Otherwise, as seen in Article 25 on its composition, it is the Agency itself —or, more precisely, its unipersonal leadership— which, by its sole will, decides how and by whom participation is exercised.”

 

Regarding its composition, the CJC adds:
“This way of regulating its composition —arbitrarily and invoking territorial and social representation criteria that are neither motivated nor objective— falls far short of a true model of participation.”
In plain language, the advisory body was elegantly warning of the disturbing possibility that the director was relying on biased or subjective selection criteria.

 

It is enough to observe the relationships between some of the organizations in the now-abolished Participation Council, their leaders and members, former Ethics Committee members, and former AVAF officials to verify the prescient accuracy of the statutory body’s opinion. The Valencian Parliament has recently taken a position, opting for a much more objective consultative model and avoiding participation by individuals whose only qualification is having held senior public office — meaning they were appointed directly by the government of the day, unlike the model followed by the new State-level Independent Whistleblower Protection Authority (A.A.I.).

 

It is claimed that this council was a vital channel. However, in practice, the participation of the association represented by the author has been non-existent. Its importance is insisted upon, but with regard to the previous code of ethics, only two organizations submitted contributions during the public consultation: AVACU (regarding the reception of gifts) and the citizen platform “Castelló per la Justícia i contra la Corrupció.” The pattern repeated itself with the new Code of Ethics recently approved: only the same citizen platform and Transparency International Spain submitted two comments. It is said to be an essential channel… but one that is absent in other regional anti-fraud agencies and, of course, the newly created national authority.

 

This brings us to the author’s next claim: that the new Code of Conduct “seriously lowers the previous standards of integrity and transparency.” To put this in context, it’s worth noting that two prestigious institutions —the Valencian Parliament (to which AVAF is accountable) and the Andalusian Anti-Fraud Office— are still in the process of developing their own codes.

 

But such a dramatic claim, coupled with accusations of “lowering institutional safeguards” and “gradually dismantling functions,” sounds striking yet is not supported by any facts. The reality is quite different: the AVAF still reports to the Valencian Parliament, not the government; it has not suffered any budget cuts; its powers remain unchanged; it continues to refer cases to the Public Prosecutor’s Office and has increased its operational activity.

 

The data —always stubborn— confirm this: the active workload when I took office was 659 cases, an inherited backlog that has since been reduced to 555 cases, despite 301 new complaints being received in 2025. As of July 23, 2024, the delay in handling complaints exceeded 15 months; now, those submitted in 2025 are being processed within legal timeframes. So far this year, four whistleblower protection requests have been made, one request for an extension of protection, and direct advice has been provided to nine individuals. Parliamentary groups have regularly requested information since July last year — 55 requests for case files have been received and addressed in due time. Most of these relate to the previous leadership period.

 

Mr. García, with all due respect, I must tell you that your statements are not accurate. I understand that you may be relying on what you have read or heard, and you are amplifying it without ill intent. But your professional background is in compliance, where unsubstantiated accusations should be contrasted with verifiable data and reliable sources.

 

Another repeated falsehood is the alleged loss of independence of the AVAF following the 2024 reform. On this point, it is useful to look at the official record — and the Spanish Official Gazette (BOE):

The new system for appointing the AVAF’s director —which involves two rounds of voting in the Valencian Parliament, requiring a three-fifths majority in the first and an absolute majority in the second— is not a product of political whim. It was actually proposed in 2022 by the previous leadership team, precisely to avoid parliamentary deadlock and to strengthen institutional stability. It is ironic that the very people who promoted this model are now its loudest critics. It should be noted that the same system is used by both the Catalan Anti-Fraud Office and the Andalusian Anti-Fraud Agency, institutions that have not faced criticism from those now expressing outrage in Valencia. What is presented as a democratic consensus and guarantee in other regions is falsely portrayed here as a threat to institutional independence.

 

This process is far more demanding than the one used for appointing the president of the State’s Independent Whistleblower Protection Authority (A.A.I.), who is directly appointed by the Council of Ministers, upon the proposal of the Minister of Justice, with the rank of undersecretary, and after a parliamentary committee hearing. So where, then, is the supposed superiority of the national model? Who does an undersecretary depend on?

 

Institutional independence is not just about how someone is appointed. It also involves structural guarantees —parliamentary oversight, budgetary autonomy, a specific legal framework— which the A.A.I. still lacks.

It is also relevant that the newly appointed president of the national authority is a founding member of Transparency International Spain, a former advisor to the “Hay Derecho” Foundation (both entities were part of the abolished Participation Council), and also served on AVAF’s Ethics Committee until the previous code of ethics was repealed — a decision made by the current signatory. It is always harder to attack a system that has chosen one of your own collaborators.

 

In short, the selective criticism of AVAF’s independence reveals more nostalgia for lost influence than genuine concern for institutional safeguards. Consistency —like a sense of humor— is rare but profoundly necessary.

I remain at your disposal for any assistance, suggestions, or recommendations from your association, which will always be appreciated and valued when aimed at preventing and fighting fraud and corruption.

 

Eduardo Beut

Director of the Agency for the Prevention and Fight Against Fraud and Corruption of the Valencian Community

Submitted to the media: June 25, 2025